We study two-sided matching where one side (colleges) can make monetary transfers (offer stipends) to the other (students). Colleges have fixed budgets and strict preferences over sets of students. One different feature of our model is that colleges value money only to the extent that it allows them to enroll better or additional students. A student can attend at most one college and receive a stipend from it. Each student has preferences over college-stipend bundles.
Introduction
We study two-sided matching where one side can make monetary transfers to the other, subject to fixed budget constraints. Some real-world examples include assigning students to graduate programs when colleges can offer stipends to students and their budgets for admissions are fixed; assigning research assistants to faculty members each of whom has a fixed research fund from which he can pay salaries to the assistants he hires; assigning workers to different projects where each project has a fixed total benefit that can be distributed among the workers assigned to that project, etc. To fix ideas, we use graduate college admissions as a running example.
Every year, students intending to pursue graduate studies apply to graduate programs. For each program, there is a maximum number of students that can be admitted. At the beginning of the year, each college determines a budget for graduate admissions. The admission committee uses this budget for stipends. Each college also specifies a maximal stipend that the committee can offer. 1 Each program has minimum requirements for admission (e.g., a minimum score of 1200 on the Graduate Record Exam (GRE), a minimum graduation grade point average (GPA) of 3 00, etc.). If a student does not fulfill these requirements, his application is not considered. Each college has strict preferences over groups of students and values money only to the extent that it allows the college to enroll better or additional students. The preferences of the colleges over groups of students are "responsive to their preferences over individual students," which means (i) adding a student who fulfills its minimum requirements to any group of students, provided this does not result in exceeding its capacity, makes the college at least as well off as before, and (ii) adding one student to any group of students is at least as desirable as adding another student to the same group of students if and only if the college finds the first student at least as desirable as the second one.
Each student has outside options: staying home or getting a job. For simplicity, for the remainder of the paper, we refer to this option as staying home, and we normalize the monetary opportunity from staying home to zero. Each student has preferences over college-stipend bundles, including staying home and receiving no money.
An allocation for a problem specifies which student is assigned to which college and the stipend he receives from it. A rule is a systematic way to assign students to colleges and allocate the budgets of the colleges as stipends among the students so that the total stipend each college offers does not exceed its budget.
The central notion for two-sided matching problems is stability. We are interested in a notion of stability called pairwise stability, which says the following: let an allocation be selected for a problem. First, no student should prefer staying home to his assignment and no college should be assigned a student who does not fulfill its minimum requirements. Next, suppose that college K prefers student A to student B, and student B is assigned to K whereas student A is not. Now, consider the following deviation by college K and student A: suppose that using the stipend offered to B, college K can offer some stipend x to A so that A prefers college K with stipend x to his initial assignment. Then both college K and student A are better off from K admitting A with stipend x and releasing B. 2 For an allocation to be pairwise stable, there should be no such deviations by a pair of a college and a student. 3 1 Introducing maximal stipends is not a real restriction: a college can still set the maximal stipend equal to its budget. In real life, colleges offer admission with different packages: applicants are separated into different groups based on their qualifications, and different maximal stipends are set for each group. All our positive results can be extended to this more general model. 2 Note that to be able to afford the stipend required to admit student A, college K can release more than one student, given that it still prefers the new assignment to the initial one. 3 We consider pairwise deviations because they are the ones likely to occur in real life: a student who is not happy with his current assignment may contact a college he is not assigned to and propose that if this college offers him admission with an appropriate stipend, he would attend it. The college would consider whether it benefits from this proposal and make a decision accordingly.
Our first main result is that for each problem, a pairwise stable allocation always exists. We show existence by means of an algorithm we construct. This algorithm always results in a pairwise stable allocation. Moreover, the rule defined through this algorithm turns out to have another desirable property: it is incentive compatible for the students, i.e., no student can ever benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. A natural question then is whether the pairwise stable allocation selected by our rule is dominated by some other pairwise stable allocation. Unfortunately, the answer is yes. However, as our final result states, no rule that selects a Pareto-undominated pairwise stable allocation (even only for students) satisfies our strong incentive compatibility requirement. Therefore, if we want a rule to be Pareto-undominated pairwise stable, then it will not satisfy the strong incentive compatibility requirement. We also show that there might be no pairwise stable allocation that is the most desirable for every student among all the pairwise stable allocations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related literature. In Section 3, we define the model and stability notion together with the incentive compatibility requirement. In Section 4, we state our main results, and we provide the proofs in the Appendix. In Section 5, we provide our concluding remarks.
Related literature
The college admissions problem was first studied by Gale and Shapley (1962) in a paper in which they propose the deferred-acceptance algorithm. When there are no monetary transfers and the preferences of colleges satisfy a certain condition called responsiveness, the deferred-acceptance algorithm selects a coalitional stable allocation, which is immune to deviations by a group of students and colleges. 4 Without any restriction on the preferences, the set of coalitional/pairwise stable allocations may be empty (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) . When money is introduced, under certain restrictions on preferences, the set of competitive allocations, which coincides with the coalitional stable set and with the core, is nonempty (Shapley and Shubik 1971 , Crawford and Knoer 1981 , Kelso and Crawford 1982 , Sotomayor 2003 , Sun and Yang 2006 .
Later, the matching problem with general "contracts" was introduced (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) . Sufficient conditions on preferences that are referred to as substitutes 5 and bilateral substitutes have been provided, guaranteeing the existence of coalitional stable 6 allocations (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005 , Hatfield and Kojima 2008 . These papers generalize most of the papers on college admissions when monetary transfers are or are not allowed. Recently, Echenique (2012) showed that under the "substitutes" condition, the matching with contracts model can be embedded within the Kelso and Crawford (1982) labor market model. He also noted that this embedding does not hold under weaker conditions of "unilateral substitutes" and "bilateral substitutes" introduced by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) . A new market design application of matching with contracts, cadet-branch matching, was introduced (Sönmez and Switzer 2013, Sönmez 2013) where the unilateral substitutes condition is satisfied but the substitutes condition is not. In that sense, Sönmez and Switzer (2013) is the first paper that provides a practical application of the matching with contracts model that cannot be embedded into the Kelso and Crawford labor market model.
Unlike the rest of the literature, we introduce fixed budget constraints. Another different feature of our model is that colleges value money only to the extent that it allows them to enroll better or additional students. This kind of assumption has been made in the literature for similar problems. One example is for hospital-doctor matching problems with application fees (Afacan 2013) , where each intern has a limited budget to apply for hospitals and has no incentive to save money as long as it helps him to apply to some additional hospital. Another is course bidding problems (Sönmez and Ünver 2010) , where each student is given a budget of fake money that they can use to bid on courses. Since the money left at the end of the process has no value for the students, they have no incentive to save.
In the terminology of matching with contracts literature, a contract is a triple consisting of a college, a student, and a stipend. We establish that in the presence of fixed budget (feasibility) constraints, the preferences of the colleges extended over contracts may fail to satisfy the unilateral and bilateral substitutes conditions, which are shown to be sufficient conditions for the existence of stable allocations Kojima 2010, Sönmez and Switzer 2013) . Thus, the results in the literature do not extend to our model.
Despite the failure of the unilateral and bilateral substitutes, we provide a possibility result related to stability. We show this result by constructing a modified version of the student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) . One additional feature of the rule defined through this algorithm is incentive compatibility: no student can ever benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. We know from the literature that in the absence of monetary transfers, there is no stable and incentive compatible rule (Roth 1982) , even if we consider incentive compatibility only for colleges (Roth 1985) . Therefore, our result on incentives is the best we can hope to obtain for our model.
Model
There is a finite set of colleges C = {c 1 c 2 c n } and a finite set of students S = {s 1 s 2 s k }. Each student may attend a college or stay home. We denote "home" as c 0 . Each college c has a capacity q c ∈ Z + . There are no restrictions on how many students stay home. Let q ≡ (q c ) c∈C be the capacity profile. A college may leave some seats empty. Each college c has strict preferences P c over all subsets of students, 2 S . That is, P c is a total order. These preferences are responsive Roth (1985) , i.e., Let P be the set of all such preferences. Let P C ≡ (P c ) c∈C be the preference profile of the colleges. Let P C be the set of all such profiles.
Each college c has a fixed budget b c ∈ R + that it can distribute as stipends to the students it admits. Let b ≡ (b c ) c∈C be the budget profile. For each college c ∈ C there is a maximal stipend m c ∈ R + that it can award to any student. To make our problem interesting, these maximal stipends are such that for each c ∈ C, we have b c ≤ m c q c . Otherwise, the excess budget (b c − m c q c > 0) is simply wasted. Let m = (m c ) c∈C be the maximal stipend profile.
Each student may attend at most one college and receive a stipend from it. An assignment for a student is a college-stipend bundle and his consumption space is C ∪ {c 0 } × R + . Staying home is the bundle (c 0 0). Each student s has preferences R s over college-stipend bundles and the option of staying home with no money, namely C ∪ {c 0 } × R + . For each s ∈ S, let P s denote the strict preference relation associated with R s , and let I s denote the indifference relation. For each student, each c ∈ C, and each x ∈ R + , bundle (c x) means admission by college c with stipend x. By (c x) P s (c x ) we mean that student s prefers (c x) to (c x ), by (c x) R s (c x ) we mean that student s finds (c x) at least as desirable as (c x ), and by (c x) I s (c x ) we mean that he is indifferent between these two bundles.
For A problem is a list π ≡ (C S P C q b m R S ). Let be the set of all problems. A matching is a function μ : S ∪ C → C ∪ {c 0 } ∪ 2 S , such that (i) for each s ∈ S, μ(s) ∈ C ∪ {c 0 } and |μ(s)| = 1; (ii) for each c ∈ C, μ(c) ∈ 2 S and |μ(c)| ≤ q c ; and (iii) for each s ∈ S and each c ∈ C, if μ(s) = c, then s ∈ μ(c). For each π ∈ , let M(π) be the set of all matchings for π. Let x c s ∈ R + be the stipend offered by college c to student s. = 0. Let A(π) denote the set of all feasible allocations for π. A rule ϕ : → π∈ A(π) associates with each problem an allocation for it.
Next, we introduce some properties for rules. Let ϕ be a rule and let π ∈ be a problem. Student s is admissible for college c if he fulfills the minimum requirements of college c, i.e., {s} P c ∅. Bundle (c x) is acceptable for student s if it is at least as desirable as staying home with no money, i.e., (c x) R s (c 0 0). Our first requirement is that colleges should enroll only admissible students, and students should find their assignments acceptable. Formally, an allocation (μ x) is individually rational for π if for each c ∈ C, each s ∈ μ(c) is admissible for c, and for each s ∈ S, the bundle (μ(s) x μ(s) s ) is acceptable for s. Let IR(π) be the set of all individually rational allocations for π. Rule ϕ is individually rational if for each π ∈ , we have ϕ(π) ∈ IR(π).
Next, we introduce two notions of blocking. Let an allocation be selected for a problem.
First, consider a college and a student that are not matched to each other. Suppose that there is a stipend that the college can afford-either by using the money left in hand or by releasing some of the students initially matched to it and using the money saved in this way plus whatever was left in hand as stipend-to offer to the student such that the student prefers this college with this stipend to his initial assignment, and the college prefers the updated class. 8 Formally, a college-student pair (c s) blocks allocation
Next is our second notion of blocking. Consider a college and a group of students that are not matched to this college. Suppose that there is a stipend list that the college can afford-either by using the money left in hand or by releasing some of the students initially matched to it and using the money saved in this way plus whatever was left in hand as stipend-to offer to these students such that each student prefers this college with the stipend to his initial assignment, and the college prefers the updated class. 9 Formally, a coalition of college and students (c S ) blocks allocation (μ x) ∈ A(π) if for each s ∈ S , we have μ(s) = c, and there areS ∈ 2 μ(c) and a list (
. 8 The class in which this student is admitted and those students whose stipends were used to compensate this student are released. 9 The class in which this group of students are admitted and some of the initially admitted students are released.
Next we define our two stability requirements. An allocation is pairwise stable for π if it is individually rational and no college-student pair can block it. Let PS(π) be the set of all pairwise stable allocations for π. Rule ϕ is pairwise stable if for each π ∈ , we have ϕ(π) ∈ PS(π). An allocation is coalitional stable for π if it is individually rational and no coalition of a college and a group of students can block it. Let CS(π) be the set of all coalitional stable allocations for π. Rule ϕ is coalitional stable if for each π ∈ , we have ϕ(π) ∈ CS(π). 10 Our final requirement is a strong incentive compatibility property. No student should ever benefit from misrepresenting his preferences. Formally, rule ϕ is strategy-
Main results
As we mentioned before, in the presence of budget constraints, the substitutes conditions, which guarantee the existence of (coalitional/pairwise) stable allocation, fail (Hatfield and Kojima 2010) . As a result, there may be no coalitional stable allocation. Appendix B gives formal definitions of the substitutes conditions, and establishes these claims.
What makes this paper interesting is despite the failure of the substitutes conditions, we still obtain an existence result on stability. This is our first main result.
Theorem 1. The pairwise stable set is nonempty.
We prove this result by constructing a modified version of the student-proposing deferred-acceptance (MSDA) algorithm, 11 which always results in a pairwise stable allocation. Moreover, it turns out that the rule associated with the MSDA algorithm satisfies a strong incentive compatibility requirement as follows.
Theorem 2. The MSDA rule is strategy-proof (for students).
We define the algorithm below and defer the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, together with the proofs of all the other results, to Appendix A.
Let π ∈ be a problem. For each student s ∈ S, let s be an order on C ∪ {c 0 }. For s ∈ S, let s (π) be the set of all possible orders on C ∪ {c 0 }, such that for each s ∈ s (π), each c ∈ C, we have c s c 0 . For each c ∈ C, let r c ∈ Z + be maximal number of students who can receive m c from c, i.e., r c ∈ Z + is such that b c − r c m c ≥ 0 and b c − (r c + 1)m c < 0.
10 By definition, pairwise stability is a weaker requirement than coalitional stability. The difference between the two requirements gets even wider in the presence of budget constraints. 11 The algorithm has the flavor of both Gale and Shapley's student-proposing deferred-acceptance algo- To define the algorithm, it is convenient to adopt the language of matching with contracts. 12 A contract is a triple d ≡ (c s x) ∈ C × S × R + to be interpreted as college c enrolling student s with stipend x. Let D be the set of all contracts. For each d ∈ D, let c(d), s(d), and x(d) denote the college, student, and the stipend specified in d. For each c ∈ C, let D c be the set of contracts that include college c, namely
We define the preferences of students and colleges over contracts as follows: for each s ∈ S and each 
Step 0. For each s ∈ S, let D s 0 ≡ D s be the set of contracts available for s.
. Let RD 1 be the set of rejected contracts in Step 1. If RD 1 = ∅, we stop. If 12 Our previous version of the algorithm used stipend offers directly instead. We thank an anonymous referee for recommending using language of contracts, which simplified most of our proofs. 13 Note that x c 2 might be equal to x c 3 , in which case there are only two possible stipend amounts that c may offer to a student. 14 Note that for each college c with x c 2 = x c 3 , a set of contracts D s includes only one of them. 15 We use the restricted choice function RCh c (·) so as to eliminate the possibility of the college choosing more than one contract with offer x c 2 . Without such a restriction a college c may choose two average RD 1 = ∅, for each s ∈ S, with d s 1 ∈ RD 1 , we let D s 1 ≡ D s 0 \ {d s 1 } and for each s ∈ S, with d s 1 / ∈ RD 1 , we let D s 1 ≡ D s 0 , and proceed to Step 2.
Step t = 2 3
. Each s ∈ S chooses a contract from D s t−1 using Ch s (·). Let d s t ≡ Ch s (D s t−1 ) be the chosen contract. Let D t ≡ s∈S Ch s (D s t−1 ) be the set of all chosen contracts. Each student s proposes to college c(d s t ) with stipend x(d s t ). For each c ∈ C, let D c t ≡ {d s t ∈ D t : c(d s t ) = c} be the set of contracts proposed to c. Each college c chooses contracts from D c t using RCh c (·). Let RD t be the set of rejected contracts in step t. Since there are finitely many students, colleges, and possible contracts for each college-student pair, and since, at each step of the algorithm, each college is made at least as well off as it was at the previous step, the MSDA algorithm terminates in finitely many steps. Appendix C illustrates how the MSDA algorithm operates by means of an example.
By Theorems 1 and 2, we know that the MSDA rule is pairwise stable and strategyproof. Is there a "better" pairwise stable allocation than the one selected by MSDA rule? Let us first explain what we mean by better. For each π ∈ , each pair (μ x), For each π ∈ , let PU(π) be the set of all Pareto-undominated pairwise stable allocations for π. Rule ϕ is Pareto-undominated pairwise stable if for each π ∈ , we have ϕ(π) ∈ PU(π).
So, let us restate our earlier question: Is MSDA a Pareto-undominated pairwise stable rule? The answer is no. In fact, our next result says more. Therefore, if we want a rule to be Pareto-undominated pairwise stable, then we have to give up strategy-proofness. To weaken this requirement we focus only on students. For each π ∈ , each pair (μ x) (μ x) ∈ A(π), allocation (μ x) student Paretodominates ). An allocation (μ x) is Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students if it is pairwise stable and there is no other pairwise stable allocation (μ x ) ∈ PS(π) that student Pareto-dominates it. For each π ∈ , let students with stipends x c 2 instead of one good student with stipend x c 1 (given that two average students together are better than that one good student). Making such a choice is basically trying to move in the direction of obtaining coalitional stable allocation, which we know is a dead end. Therefore, using the restricted choice function for colleges is crucial for the MSDA algorithm to result in pairwise stable allocation.
PUs(π) be the set of all Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students allocations for π. Rule ϕ is Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students if for each π ∈ , we have ϕ(π) ∈ PUs(π).
The next corollary states that even if we restrict attention only to students, the results of Theorem 3 still hold.
Corollary 1. No Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students rule is strategyproof.
Finally, since the pairwise stable set is nonempty, a natural follow-up question concerns the structure of this set? For each π ∈ , an allocation (μ x) is student-optimal pairwise stable if for each s ∈ S, and each (μ x ) ∈ PS(π), we have (μ x) student Paretodominates (μ x ). We know from the literature that when monetary transfers are not allowed, the student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm always selects studentoptimal stable allocation. Unfortunately, for our model, student-optimal pairwise stable allocation may not exist. 16 Proposition 1. There are problems for which no student-optimal pairwise stable allocation exists.
Concluding remarks
We study two-sided matching problems where one-way monetary transfers are allowed. Differently from the earlier literature, in this paper, we specify a fixed budget for each college. Another different feature of our model is that colleges value money only to the extent that it allows them to enroll better or additional students. We show that introducing budget constraints results in the failure of the substitutes conditions (Proposition 2 in Appendix B), which are essential for most of the results in the literature. Despite the failure of these conditions, we obtain a positive result: a pairwise stable allocation always exists (Theorem 1). We define a rule through an algorithm we construct that not only selects a pairwise stable allocation, but also satisfies the strong incentive compatibility requirement that no student can ever benefit from misrepresenting his preferences (Theorem 2). Our final result states that we cannot find a better (in terms of efficiency) pairwise stable rule, unless we give up the incentives condition (Theorem 3 and Corollary 1).
We realize that in real life there is no centralized system and each student independently applies to graduate programs. Therefore, it is highly likely that the resulting allocations are not stable and there is the possibility for deviations. The main motivation for this paper was to first address the question, "Is there a way to assign students to colleges and allocate the budgets of the colleges among students so that no student and 16 This kind of phenomenon has been observed in the literature as well (Kominers and Sönmez 2016) .
Some may view this result as one of the reasons for the negative results in Theorem 3 and Corollary 1. Moreover, for each problem π, if we define the preferences of the students as an order on the A(π), then by Proposition 1, the set of pairwise stable allocations does not have lattice structure. college will benefit from deviating?" We answer this question in the positive and we also provide a rule that not only selects a stable allocation, but also satisfies other desirable properties.
One can also construct a modification of the college-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm (MCDA) with some adjustments due to budget constraints, where colleges make offers starting from the maximal stipend. 17 Although the MCDA rule is pairwise stable, it is not strategy-proof (for students).
Appendix A: Omitted proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose by contradiction that there is a problem π with MSDA(π) = (μ x), a college-student pair (c s) with μ(s) = c,S ∈ 2 μ(c) , and x s ∈ R + , such that
First, note that for each college c, if x c 2 = x c 3 , then only one student receives stipend x c 2 from it. While blocking allocation (μ x), college c releases students inS for one or both of the following reasons: (i) to obtain an empty seat for s and/or (ii) to obtain a stipend x s for s. We argue that college c can achieve both (i) and (ii) by releasing at most one student Claim 1. If there isS with |S| > 1 satisfying requirements (a), (b), (c), and (d) above, then there isŜ ⊂S, with |Ŝ| ≤ 1 satisfying these requirements.
Proof. We consider three cases:
Since only one student receives stipend x c 2 , there is s ∈S with x c s = x c 1 = m c . Then, so as to offer x s to s, it suffices to release student s .
(If x c 2 = x c 3 , this case is redundant.) Since only one student receives stipend x c 2 , either he or some student with a higher stipend is inS. Then, so as to offer x s to s, it suffices to release the student with stipend x c 2 . Case (iii). Let x s = x c 3 = 0. Since s requires no stipend, it suffices to release any student.
Once we know that to block and offer x s to s college c needs to release at most one student, we differentiate three cases: 17 When money is a finitely divisible good, the MCDA algorithm can also be defined in the spirit of the "salary-adjustment" rule offered by Kelso and Crawford (1982) , where stipend offers start from zero and increase upon rejection by the student. But due to the budget constraints, such an algorithm may not converge, i.e., there might be cycles within the algorithm.
Case 1: x s ∈ (x c 2 x c 1 ]. This implies that at some step t, student s applied to college c with x c 1 (i.e., with contract (s c x c 1 )). Since s / ∈ μ(c), college c rejected s at some later step t . In other words, at step t , there are at least r c students who applied to c with stipend x c 1 and are better than s for c. Since college c does not get worse off at any later step, there are at least r c students in μ(c) with stipends x c 1 who are better than s for c. Therefore, there is no student in μ(c) whom college c can release so as to deviate and offer x s to s.
Case 2: x s ∈ (x c 3 x c 2 ] and x c 2 = x c 3 . This case is similar to Case 1. Case 3: x s = 0. Once again this case is similar to Case 1.
Before providing the proof of Theorem 2, we introduce a notion and a lemma. For each π ∈ , if for each c ∈ C we have b c = m c q c , then budget constraints b are not binding for π. Let NB ⊆ be the set of all problems where no budget constraint is binding. Lemma 1. Let π ≡ (C S P C q b m R S ) ∈ NB. We define the associated problem CA(π) = (Ĉ Ŝ P C q P S ), whereĈ = C,Ŝ = S,q = q, andP C = P C . Preferences of student s ∈Ŝ,P s , overĈ are defined as follows: for each pair c c ∈Ĉ, cR s c if and only if for each x ∈ R + , (c x) R s (c x). To clarify, CA(π) is the college admission problem without money that we obtain from π. Let (μ x) ≡ MSDA(π) and μ ≡ DA(CA(π)), where DA is the usual student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, formally defined in Gale and Shapley (1962) The rest follows from the wayP C andP S are defined.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let π ∈ . Without loss of generality, for each c ∈ C, let x c 2 = x c 3 . The proof trivially extends to the case when for some (or all) colleges equality holds. Let MSDA(π) = (μ x). Note the following properties of (μ x):
• If there is c ∈ C with |μ(c)| > r c + 1, then r c students in μ(c) obtain m c , one student obtains b c − r c m c , and q c − r c − 1 students obtain 0.
• If there is c ∈ C with |μ(c)| = r c + 1, then r c students in μ(c) obtain m c and one student obtains b c − r c m c .
• If there is c ∈ C with |μ(c)| ≤ r c , then all students in μ(c) obtain m c .
From each c ∈ C, we create three "clones" of college c:
• Clone c 1 is a type 1 clone: it has capacityq c 1 = r c , budgetb c 1 = r c m c , and maximal stipendm c 1 = m c .
• Clone c 2 is a type 2 clone: it has capacityq c 2 = 1, budgetb c 2 = b c − r c m c , and maximal stipendm c 2 = b c − r c m c .
• Clone c 3 is a type 3 clone: it has capacityq c 3 = q c − r c − 1, budgetb c 3 = 0, and maximal stipendm c 3 = 0.
Note that if there is c ∈ C with q c = r c , then c only has type 1 clones, and if q c = r c + 1, then c has only type 1 and type 2 clones. Also note that for each c ∈ C, b c = 3 i=1bc i and q c = 3 i=1qc i . . Since for each c ∈ C and each i ∈ {1 2 3}, we haveb c i =q c im c i , the budget constraintsb are not binding forπ. Then by Lemma 1, and results in Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) that for the college admissions problem when monetary transfers are not allowed, the student-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm is strategy-proof for students, we obtain our result.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let ϕ be a Pareto-undominated pairwise stable rule. Let π ∈ be such that C = {c 1 c 2 c 3 } and S = {s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 s 6 }. Let B = (7 7 7), m = (7 7 7), and q = (2 2 2).
Let preferences of students be By Theorems 1 and 2, the MSDA rule is pairwise stable and strategy-proof. Unfortunately, MSDA is not a Pareto-undominated pairwise stable rule. To prove the theorem, all we need to do is to identify the pairwise stable allocations that Pareto-dominate MSDA(π) = (μ x) and show that no strategy-proof rule selects any of these allocations. Let PD(μ x) be the set of allocations (not necessarily pairwise stable) that Paretodominate (μ x). For each (μ x) ∈ PD(μ x), the matchingμ should be one of the following two scenarios:
(i) We haveμ = μ , where μ is such that μ (c 1 ) = {s 1 s 4 }, μ (c 2 ) = {s 2 s 5 }, and μ (c 3 ) = {s 3 s 6 }.
(ii) We haveμ = μ , where μ is such that μ (c 1 ) = {s 2 s 3 }, μ (c 2 ) = {s 4 s 5 }, and μ (c 3 ) = {s 1 s 6 }.
As we show next, the allocations obtained with matching μ are not pairwise stable.
Claim 2. (μ x ) / ∈ PS(π). Let us write the allocation as
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (μ x ) ∈ PS(π). Then, by individual rationality, x 5 ≥ 1 + (otherwise, student s 5 prefers (c 0 0) to (c 2 x 5 )). This implies that x 2 = 7 − x 5 < 6. But then, since s 2 P c 1 s 4 and (c 1 0) P s 2 (c 2 x 2 ), pair (c 1 s 2 ) blocks (μ x ) with stipend 0.
Therefore, for (μ x) ∈ PD(μ x) we haveμ = μ . Let us write the allocation as
Next, we define some constraints on stipends to guarantee (μ x ) being pairwise stable:
• We have x 2 ≥ x 5 − 5: otherwise, (c 2 s 2 ) forms a blocking pair with stipend x 5 .
• We have x 3 ≥ x 6 − 6: otherwise, (c 3 s 3 ) forms a blocking pair with stipend x 6 .
• We have x 1 ≥ x 3 − 6: otherwise, (c 1 s 1 ) forms a blocking pair with stipend x 1 .
• We have x 1 ≥ x 2 − 6: otherwise, (c 1 s 1 ) forms a blocking pair with stipend x 1 .
One can easily identify that if x 2 + x 3 = x 5 − 5 + x 6 − 6 = 3, then no blocking pair includes either s 2 or s 3 . Thus, for any pairwise stable allocation that matches both s 2 and s 3 with c 1 , the following conditions should be satisfied: x 2 ≥ x 5 − 5, x 3 ≥ x 6 − 6, and x 2 + x 3 ≥ 3. If (μ x ) is Pareto-undominated pairwise stable, then x 2 + x 3 ≥ 7.
To make the proof clearer, we will, without loss of generality, fix values for x 5 = 7, x 6 = 7, and x 1 = 0 (note that for given numbers, all the constraints above are satisfied). Thus, for (μ x ) to be Pareto-undominated pairwise stable, our constraints simplify to x 2 ∈ [2 6], x 3 ∈ [1 5], and x 2 + x 3 = 7.
Next we consider two cases: Case 1: x 2 < 6. LetR s 2 be such that (c 1 6)Î s 2 (c 2 6)Î s 2 (c 3 8)Î s 2 (c 0 0). Let π be obtained from π by only changing the preferences of student s 2 toR s 2 instead of R s 2 . Then the set of Pareto-undominated pairwise stable allocations forπ is (μ x) = {(s 1 c 3 x 1 ) (s 2 c 1 x 2 ) (s 3 c 1 x 3 ) (s 4 c 2 x 4 ) (s 5 c 2 x 5 ) (s 6 c 3 x 6 )}, with constraints includingx 1 + 6 ≥x 2 ≥ max{x 5 6} = 6. Otherwise, whenx 2 < 6, the allocation is not individually rational; whenx 5 >x 2 > 6, pair (c 2 s 2 ) forms a blocking pair with stipendx 5 and whenx 2 >x 1 + 6, pair (c 1 s 1 ) forms a blocking pair with stipendx 2 . Thus, x 2 ≥ 6. Since (c 1 x 2 ) P s 2 (c 1 x 2 ), student s 2 benefits from misreporting his preferences asR s 2 .
Case 2: x 3 < 5. LetR s 3 be such that (c 1 5)Î s 3 (c 2 8)Î s 3 (c 3 6)Î s 2 (c 0 9). Let π be obtained from π by only changing the preferences of student s 3 toR s 3 instead of R s 3 . Then the set of Pareto-undominated pairwise stable allocations forπ is (μ x) = {(s 1 c 3 x 1 ) (s 2 c 1 x 2 ) (s 3 c 1 x 3 ) (s 4 c 2 x 4 ) (s 5 c 2 x 5 ) (s 6 c 3 x 6 )}, with constraints includingx 1 + 6 ≥x 3 ≥ max{x 6 − 1 5} = 5. Otherwise, whenx 2 < 5, allocation is not individually rational; whenx 6 − 1 >x 2 > 5, pair (c 3 s 3 ) forms a blocking pair with stipendx 6 , and whenx 3 >x 1 + 6, pair (c 1 s 1 ) forms a blocking pair with stipendx 3 . Thus,x 3 ≥ 5. Since (c 1 x 3 ) P s 3 (c 1 x 3 ), student s 3 benefits from misreporting his preferences asR s 3 .
Therefore, by strategy-proofness, x 2 = 6 and x 2 = 5, and thus, x 2 + x 3 = 11 > 7 = B c 1 , which is a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1. We know from the proof of Theorem 3 that the MSDA rule is not Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students. Consider the problem in the proof of Theorem 3. Pick a rule that is Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students. Note that s 2 and s 3 can be made better than they are at (μ x), if only they are matched to c 1 , with stipends greater than 1 and 2, respectively. If either one but not the other is matched, then the allocation is not pairwise stable. If neither is matched, then by Pareto-undominated pairwise stability for students, the matching has to be μ (since at least one student should be better off), which we know is not pairwise stable. If both of them are matched to c 1 , then by pairwise stability, the matching has to be μ , for which we know that no strategy-proof rule selects such an allocation. Therefore, no rule that is Pareto-undominated pairwise stable for students is strategy-proof. } be two pairwise stable allocations for π. Student s prefers (μ x) to (μ x ) and student s prefers (μ x ) to (μ x). For an allocation (μ * x * ) to be the student optimal pairwise stable allocation, we should have x * s ≥ 7 and x * s ≥ 7, which is not feasible, since x * s + x * s ≥ 14 > 13 = b c . Thus, there is no student optimal pairwise stable allocation for this problem.
Appendix B: Substitutes conditions and coalitional stability
For the matching with contracts model, several conditions on the preferences of the colleges have been introduced that guarantee the existence of stable allocations (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005 , Hatfield and Kojima 2008 , Sönmez and Switzer 2013 . We show that in the presence of fixed budget constraints, the preferences of the colleges over contracts do not necessarily satisfy these conditions.
In words, contracts are substitutes for a college if addition of a contract to the choice set never induces a college to choose a contract it previously rejected. Differently from the substitutes condition, the bilateral substitutes condition requires that the student in previously rejected and newly added contracts should not be in any other contract in the choice set. Formally, for each c ∈ C, contracts are substitutes for college c if there is Note that in the proof neither the maximal stipend nor the capacity constraint are binding. Therefore, the failure of the bilateral substitutes condition is entirely due to the budget constraint.
Given the failure of the bilateral substitutes condition, which is a sufficient condition for the existence of stable allocation, our next result may not seem so surprising: there may be no coalitionally stable allocation. To prove this, it suffices to focus on coalitions consisting of one college and at most two students. We use a modified version of the example in Mongell and Roth (1986) .
Proposition 3. There is a problem π ∈ with CS(π) = ∅.
Proof. Let C = {c 1 c 2 } and S = {s 1 s 2 s 3 }. Let b = (5 11), m = (5 11), and q = (2 2).
The preferences of students are IR 1 : College c 1 offers stipends x 2 ∈ (4 5] to s 2 and x 3 ∈ (4 5 5] to s 3 . 19 IR 2 : College c 2 offers stipends x 1 ∈ (10 11] to s 1 , x 2 ∈ (8 11] to s 2 , and x 3 ∈ (2 11] to s 3 .
Since x 1 + x 2 > 11 = b c 2 and x 1 + x 3 > 11 = b c 2 , there is no individually rational allocation at which c 2 is assigned student s 1 together with some other student. Similarly, since x 2 + x 3 > 5 = b c 1 , there is no individually rational allocation at which c 1 is assigned students s 2 and s 3 simultaneously.
Let (μ x) ∈ IR(π). We consider several cases: Case 1: μ(c 2 ) = {s 2 s 3 }. 20 Since s 1 is not admissible for c 1 , we have μ(c 1 ) = ∅ and μ(s 1 ) = c 0 . Given budget constraint x c 2 s 2 + x c 2 s 3 ≤ 11 and by IR 2 , we know that x c 2 s 2 ∈ (8 9) and x c 2 s 3 ∈ (2 3). Note that for student s 3 , bundle (c 2 x c 2 s 3 ) is better than any offer c 1 can make. Alternatively, for each x c 2 s 2 ∈ (8 9), we have (c 1 5) P s 2 (c 2 x c 2 2 ). Then pair c 1 and s 2 block (μ x) with stipend 5.
Case 2: Let μ(c 2 ) = {s 1 }. By IR 2 , we know that x c 2 s 1 ∈ (10 11]. As we mentioned before, c 1 cannot be assigned students s 2 and s 3 simultaneously. Thus, it is assigned either one of these students or neither of them. We consider several subcases.
Subcase 2.1: μ(c 1 ) = ∅. Since {s 2 } P c 1 {s 3 } P c 1 ∅, (c 1 5) P s 2 (c 0 0), and (c 1 5) P s 3 (c 0 0), the pair of c 1 with either of these students blocks (μ x) with stipend 5.
Subcase 2.2: μ(c 1 ) = {s 2 }. By IR 1 we know that x c 1 s 2 ∈ (4 5]. Since {s 3 } P c 1 {s 2 } and (c 1 5) P s 2 (c 0 0), the pair of c 1 and s 3 blocks (μ x) with stipend 5.
Subcase 2.3: μ(c 1 ) = {s 3 }. By IR 1 we know that x c 1 s 3 ∈ (4 5 5]. Since {s 2 s 3 } P c 2 {s 1 }, (c 2 2 6) P s 3 (c 1 x c 1 s 3 ), and (c 2 8 4) P s 3 (c 0 0), the coalition of c 1 , s 2 , and s 3 blocks (μ x) with stipends 2 6 and 8 4, respectively.
Case 3: μ(c 2 ) = {s 3 }. Note that μ(s 1 ) = c 0 . Since {s 1 } P c 2 {s 3 } and (c 2 11) P s 1 (c 0 0), the pair of c 2 and s 1 blocks (μ x) with stipend 11.
Case 4: μ(c 2 ) = {s 2 }. Note that μ(s 1 ) = c 0 . Since {s 1 } P c 2 {s 2 } and (c 2 11) P s 1 (c 0 0), the pair of c 2 and s 1 blocks (μ x) with stipend 11.
Case 5: μ(c 2 ) = ∅. Note that μ(s 1 ) = c 0 . Since {s 1 } P c 2 ∅ s and (c 2 11) P s 1 (c 0 0), the pair of c 2 and s 1 blocks (μ x) with stipend 11.
Thus, there is no coalitional stable allocation. Step 0. For each s ∈ S, we have D s 0 = D s . Step 1. Each student s ∈ S chooses the most preferred contract in D s 0 , namely, We proceed to Step 6.
Step 6. Each student s ∈ S choose the most preferred contract in D s 5 : 
